1. "What in fact happened to those big, terrifying, new Soviet missiles that were seen on the horizon--those missiles that were supposed to be substantially larger than the huge SS-9 missile?"

Comment. The Soviets are continuing to test a large new ICBM--the SS-X-18--that is expected to replace the SS-9.

25X1B


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SS-9.

Because of the relatively slow pace of testing, the missile is not expected to be ready for deployment before early 1975.

2. "What ever happened to those huge new holes mentioned in press accounts which were supposed to presage deployment of a new generation of still larger missiles?"



3. "What ever happened to the tremendous Soviet throw weight advantage mentioned last year? Is the Soviet megatonnage now increasing or declining? Is the megatonnage disparity between the two sides growing or being reduced? Much of the megatonnage in the Soviet force was centered in the approximately 200-missile SS-7 and SS-8 fleet. What happened to that fleet? Are there indications that the Russians will soon be retiring that fleet?

25X1D 25X1D Comment. The four-fold Soviet advantage in ICBM throw weight increased slightly during the past

This advantage is expected to decrease in the late seventies, however, as the Soviets phase out their SS-7 and SS-8 launchers. The US has the advantage in SLBM throw weight, and is expected to retain the lead as more Poseidons and eventually Tridents are deployed.

The Soviet strategic attack forces consist of ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers which as a whole have about twice the total megatonnage of their US counterparts. This advantage is increasing slightly as the new type silos become operational and newly constructed Y and D class ballistic missile submarines join the fleet. Soviet megatonnage is expected to decline in the latter part of the decade, as the Soviets place lower-yield multiple warheads on their ICBMs and SLBMs.

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THE SEMETAREISHIVE

4. "We know what has happened to our ABM plans. The Congress has sensibly rejected the idea of spending billions of dollars on that dubious enterprise.

But what about the Soviet Union? They, like us, are limited to two sites. When the treaty was signed last year, the Soviets had only 64 ABM interceptors deployed and only a single complex. Are there more than 64 missiles now? Have any steps been taken to begin the allowed second complex?"



Filed Senate Government Operations Committee -Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations - 1973 Attached to Journal 14 June 73 #2

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